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On November 7, 2013, on the heels of a heated public debate about the role of reli-gion in public life, the government of Québec tabled its controversial Bill 60,
Charter Affirming the Values of State Secularism and Religious Neutrality and of Equality
Between Women and Men, and Providing a Framework for Accommodation Requests.
The legislation, introduced by Bernard Drainville, at the time the minister for demo-
cratic institutions and active citizenship, sought to afﬁrm the religious neutrality of
the state, in particular by prohibiting public sector employees—including those work-
ing in hospitals, schools, daycares, and universities—from wearing “signes ostentatoires”
(“conspicuous religious symbols”). The legislation also proposed to amend the Québec
Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms in order to enshrine the “equality of men and
women” as the highest human right to which other rights (such as freedom of religious
expression) would be subordinated. From the initial indications from the government
concerning this legislative initiative in May of 2013, through a noisy publicity campaign
launched in September, to televised public hearings over the winter, and culminating
in the stunning electoral defeat of the governing Parti Québécois on April 7, 2014, the
Charter of Québec Values (as it was popularly named) created tremendous division
within Québec society, lining up politicians, journalists, media celebrities, unions, and
other public ﬁgures and institutions onto bitterly opposing sides. Supporters of the
charter characterized the initiative as a consummation of the Quiet Revolution of the
1960s, when Québec society ﬁrst began to reject the dominant political role enjoyed
by the Catholic Church, and thus a necessary step to protect the public sphere from
“religious inﬂuence.” In this respect, the charter was clearly inspired by legal initiatives
in France and elsewhere in Europe (see Arêas, 2015; Gonzalez, 2015), and as such it
was framed as a repudiation of “Canadian” multiculturalism policy, which for its part
was perceived by its detractors as a weak and dangerously indiscriminate mechanism
for regulating cultural and religious diversity and for securing social solidarity. On the
other side, opponents decried the charter as a thinly disguised attack on religious mi-
norities—especially Muslim women, who risked facing unprecedented barriers to em-
ployment and participation in public life—and a sign of the Québec government’s
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lamentable endorsement of a broader Islamophobia that has swept the Western world
in the post-9/11 context.
The defeat of the government at the polls in the spring of 2014 would seem to in-
dicate that the agenda of the charter has now come to an end, and that Québec voters
have rejected its divisive politics. In the words of Drainville, the principal architect of
Bill 60, on the day after the election: “It’s over, the Charter. We did what we could to get
there. Unfortunately, things ended rather abruptly” (Lemay, 2014). However, a longer
view of the debate surrounding Bill 60, and of the social factors that fuelled this debacle,
suggests that the charter’s underlying politics of religious identity and inclusion have
far from subsided. Certainly, concerns about the visual signs of “religious radicalism”
continue to be expressed both within Québec and across the rest of Canada, not least
with regard to the wearing of the niqab and the burqa and their perceived threats to
Canadian public civility (cf. Arêas, 2015). What follows is a closer analysis of some of
the terms on which the previous Québec government sought to regulate religious dif-
ference in the public sphere. It remains to be seen how the newly elected Liberal gov-
ernment in Québec—or any other provincial or federal government in Canada, one
might hazard to suggest—will manage these questions of religious identity and diversity,
and whether they will end up entangled in the very same language of “liberal tolerance”
one ﬁnds at the root of the previous Québec government’s charter initiative.
To unearth the reasons why the animating force of Bill 60 might remain in play
within Québec politics, even in the wake of the recent election, we need to examine
more closely one of the key planks of the proposed charter, namely its proposal to
draw a line between “ostentatious” and “non-ostentatious” religious signs, and their
respective degrees of permissibility within the public sector workplace. “From this
point on,” it was stated in one document explaining the government’s legislative in-
tention, “those working for the state must demonstrate their religious neutrality, not
only in their behaviour but also in their appearance” (Government of Quebec, 2013,
p. 4, my translation). To ensure this “appearance of religious neutrality,” the proposed
Bill 60 would speciﬁcally proscribe the wearing of religious signs that were deemed to
be “easily visible” and that possessed the power to “draw attention” to themselves
(ayant un caractère demonstratif). The language adopted here of visibility and atten-
tion—condensed in the key category, that of “signes ostentatoires”—was embedded in
a larger conversation concerning the place of religion in modern nation-states, as em-
phasized by none other than then-Premiere Pauline Marois, when, during one media
scrum, she defended her government’s initiative as conforming to “a well-known in-
ternational standard.” No doubt, one of the most important precedents being invoked
here was that of France, which in 2003 tasked the Stasi Commission to help “defend
secularism” within the French public school system through the codiﬁcation of ac-
ceptable legal limits for the wearing of religious attire (Government of France, 2003).
In this context, the Québec initiative offered a variation of what has already become
a familiar international theme that conceives secularism and its threats in speciﬁcally
visual terms. The word “ostentation,” after all, assumes an intentionality on the part
of the wearer to be noticed: more precisely, to be noticed in an excessive, provocative
manner. In this framework, undesirable religious afﬁliations and modes of public pres-
entation can be treated as forms of visible pollution (cf. Gonzalez, 2015).
Source: © Gouvernement de Québec, 2013. Reproduction interdite sans avoir obtenu l’authorisation écrite /
Reproduction must be approved in writing.
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Figure 1
To help clarify the terms on which state neutrality was to be defended, as well as
to generate broader support for the bill, in the late summer of 2013, the Québec gov-
ernment launched a public relations campaign, one element of which was an info-
graphic (see Figure 1) designed to concretize this distinction between (permissibly)
“non-ostentatious” and (impermissibly) “ostentatious” religious signs. On one side,
one ﬁnds a hijab, a niqab, a kippa, a dastar (Sikh turban), and a “large” cruciﬁx; lined
up on the other side are several items of jewellery—a small cruciﬁx, a ring bearing a
Star of David, and a crescent moon-shaped earring. What is going on here?
First, let us note how the infographic performs the work of comparative religion
through the generation of equivalences. A rather disparate collection of bodily disci-
plines, habits, aesthetic sensibilities, and material affordances for the cultivation of
piety disappears behind the surface of signs that function synecdochally as markers
of one’s religious identity and afﬁliation. Not unlike the sumptuariae leges of Ancient
Rome, in which different colours and types of clothing served to distinguish citizens
according to their age, gender, and social rank, the modern liberal state conceives of
its agents as “a unity encompassing difference,” while at the same time providing a vi-
sual means for distinguishing between tolerable and intolerable categories of persons.
Indeed, once they enter the arena of the “neutral state,” regardless of the intentions
or assumptions of their wearers, the hijab, the niqab, the kippa, and the dastar all be-
come equally recognizable as “visual matter out of order”; they are now markers of
identity and afﬁliation that somehow risk occluding the very possibility of an integral
and consistent form of state agency.
Following closely from this, we might further note that whereas much discussion
of Bill 60 focused on the proposal to ban ostentatious signs, this infographic pointed
out how the modern state has had an equal stake in deﬁning the category of the “non-
ostentatious” religious sign. This was explained by some as a “compromise solution,”
whereby the government of the day—recognizing that the removal of all visible evi-
dence of religious afﬁliation was untenable—opted to make provision for a degree of
“tolerable offense” to its vaunted principle of state neutrality. With the creation of the
category of “permitted religious signs,” it was argued by some, the government was
simply seeking to preempt protracted legal debate over whether the bill was discrim-
inatory against religious minorities, or whether it failed to protect the fundamental
human right of liberty of conscience. It might also be suggested that the bill was crafted
to avoid rufﬂing the feathers of the large numbers of practicing Christians currently
working in Québec’s public sector—a not insigniﬁcant number of whom happen to
wear (typically small) cruciﬁxes around their necks or pinned onto their clothing. The
visual code presented here thus seemed to be designed to focus attention more nar-
rowly on “undesirable” religious minorities, while at the same time allowing the gov-
ernment to proclaim its even-handedness and willingness to compromise. But
whatever the actual intentions of the government, the deployment of this category of
the “permitted sign” wonderfully epitomized a much larger and more longstanding
liberal project to (re)construct modern religions as spheres of personal conviction, and
to ground the authority of the state in the consensus of religious communities and ac-
tors to make themselves recognizable on such terms.
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The non-ostentatious sign is thus a marker of religion that “knows its place” in
the pax moderna of privatized, personal convictions and secular state power. And, in
the benevolent, paternalistic spirit of this project to contain religion, a gesture was
made toward “impolite” forms of religious activity. As depicted in the infographic
(Figure 1), those deemed guilty of visual offence are offered substitute signs through
which their religious identities, afﬁliations, convictions, and practices might be made
more acceptable, such as a Star of David ring or a crescent moon-shaped earring.
Paradoxically, the very state that sought to create and protect a form of public space
as “religiously neutral” ended up inventing entirely new religious practices by creating
its own iconographic repertoire that would allow kippa-wearing Jews, hijab-wearing
Muslims, and dastar-wearing Sikhs to enter into the public space of the state and join
the ranks of its small-cruciﬁx-bearing liberal citizens. This paradoxical gesture should
not surprise us. On the contrary, the strange visual language of Bill 60 perfectly instan-
tiates what Talal Asad (2006) has described as “the game of religious signs” (p. 504)
played by the secular state, which, in the act of being played, allows the abstract being
of the modern state to be realized in the ﬁrst place. What new versions of this game
will be invented by future governments in Québec, or for that matter, anywhere else
in the world, where the fantasy of securing liberal public tolerance through the priva-
tization of religious conviction continues to hold sway?
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